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Massachusetts has recently  gained  worldwide  attention  as an ex-
ample of successful economic revitalization through technological  de-
velopment.  The  core  of this technological  revolution  has  been  the
remarkable  explosion of entrepreneurial  activity in the state.
The Massachusetts Experience
By 1975 Massachusetts had experienced nearly twenty-five years of
industrial  stagnation  resulting  from  the  out-migration  of older  in-
dustries to the more rapidly  growing  U.S.  South.  During the seven
year  period ending  in  1975,  112,000 manufacturing  jobs  had  been
lost-roughly one job out of five.
State  and local  taxes  were pushed  to  levels that made  them the
highest  of all  the  states.  The  unemployment  rate jumped  to more
than  11 percent.  Welfare  rolls reflected  the pervasive  nature  of our
dilemma; of the 5.7 million persons living in Massachusetts in 1975,
1.25 million were receiving some form of state welfare  assistance.
During the second half of the 1970s, however, there was a dramatic
turnabout  in Massachusetts  as nearly  100,000  new  manufacturing
jobs were  created.  The microcomputer  and computer  peripheral  in-
dustries engineered  drastic reductions  in the size and  cost  of their
products that, together  with advances in technical and software  de-
sign, generated  an explosion in private sector applications.
By  the  early  1980s  the  Massachusetts  unemployment  rate  had
fallen below 4 percent-the  lowest of all industrial states. Sharp state
revenue growth led to lower taxes and the vigorous demand for labor
virtually eliminated the welfare problem.
To  many  of us this dramatic  revitalization  was  the  second  most
significant  step  in market  capitalism-the  first  was the Industrial
Revolution that took place  in northern England-and the confirma-
tion that an industrially mature  and stagnant  area can be revital-
16ized through a rebirth of manufacturing activity utilizing technology
and the vigorous growth of sophisticated  services.
As  we  review the  Massachusetts  revitalization,  three key factors
appear to have played a dominant role:  high levels  of entrepreneur-
ship,  a rapid process  of technology  transfer and aggressive  capital
financing.
High Levels  of Entrepreneurship
The revitalization process in Massachusetts  was shaped and driven
by individuals-not  by organizations. The  business development en-
vironment in Massachusetts is one in which innovation  and new en-
terprises are actively encouraged  and expected.
Indeed,  Dr.  Frank  Newman,  president  of the  Education  Commis-
sion of the States, has remarked that what distinguishes Massachu-
setts  from  other  parts  of the  United  States  is the  presence  of an
"opportunistic"  environment  that  favors  innovation  and  that,  in
turn,  attracts  "risk lovers"-the  very  type  of individuals  who  are
likely to pursue  a new technical  idea  with tenacity  and determina-
tion  to  become  successful  entrepreneurs  (Rogers  and  Shoemaker;
Allen).
For  many years,  individual  entrepreneurial  behavior  was  poorly
understood.  While  five  decades  ago  the  early  works  of  Joseph
Schumpeter underscored  the importance  of individual  effort in the
process  of innovation,  it was  not until the mid-1960s  that  we were
able to develop a more complete picture of the entrepreneur.  Based on
research  undertaken  by Professor Edward Roberts  of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology  (MIT) we now know that entrepreneurs
usually  share  similar  family  backgrounds,  motivations  and  educa-
tional attainment.  Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs have a high level
of goal  orientation  and  motivation.  A large  part  of this  has been
demonstrated  to have  grown out of the day-to-day activities  of their
families during their "growing up" years. Goal orientation and fam-
ily relationships in turn affect the level of education, especially of the
technical entrepreneur  who generally has at least an undergraduate
degree  and, more  likely, advanced degrees  in both management  and
engineering. Further, 50 to 60  percent  of entrepreneurs  come  from
families in which the father was  self-employed.  Finally, the new en-
terprise  founder  is usually  in his thirties  at the  start  of the  new
business  development  venture,  and new  venture  starts fall  off dra-
matically as age increases.
Those  personal  characteristics  are  interesting,  but perhaps  more
interesting is why entrepreneurs  tend to be clustered  in selected ar-
eas rather than randomly distributed through society. A large part of
the answer  appears to be related to the presence of outstanding col-
leges and universities-particularly  engineering  and medical  schools
(Lipset).
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greater Boston area alone-with their internationally-recognized  sci-
entists,  engineers  and  research  labs  have  played  a  critical  role  in
attracting  the "best  and brightest"  from all over the United States
and the world. Further, having attended these academic institutions,
graduates  tend to stay in the area. For example,  more than  90 per-
cent of the electrical  engineers  who received their final schooling  in
New England remained in the region for employment.
Universities  can also influence  an entrepreneur's decision  to start
a new technology  firm. This has particularly been the case  in certain
technical universities such as MIT in which senior university admin-
istrators  have encouraged  entrepreneurial  behavior  among  faculty.
This "outer directedness"  stands in sharp contrast to the more tradi-
tional academic emphasis  on research  and publication as the means
to  advancement  and  tenure.  In  this connection,  senior  faculty  can
become significant agents of change as well as "role  models" for jun-
ior faculty  and students.
It is here that we are able to make two specific  observations  about
entrepreneurial  energies and rural development.  The first is obvious:
the agglomeration  of educational and research facilities has played a
dominant  role  in attracting,  keeping  and producing  the "agents"  of
technological  innovation.  One can hardly imagine how this could be
replicated  in rural areas, although the land grant colleges  have cer-
tainly done a respectable job in a limited number of areas. The point
is that rural areas  should  concentrate  on attracting and  exploiting
new ideas that  have already  become  part of the  existing stream  of
technology rather than attempting to  become a major player  in the
generation  of new ideas.
The second observation  concerns the market forces that shape the
activities of the scientific entrepreneur  in Massachusetts.  From the
very beginning of the entrepreneur's creation  of the new technology-
driven firm, future growth and indeed ultimate  survival will be  de-
termined by the discipline of the market mechanism.  In other words,
in order to  survive, the new  firm must  maximize  profitability  in a
market in which there are  competitively  adjusting prices and great
uncertainty.
This  market  environment  seems  quite  different  from  the  one  in
which the American  or European farmer  seems  to operate.  Specifi-
cally, it is not necessarily, nor solely, profitability that must be maxi-
mized  by  the  farmer.  Rather,  in  an  environment-at  least
historically-in  which  prices  are  set  by  the  support  program,  the
farmer's  goal becomes  more one  of maximizing output at prevailing
market prices.
To me this distinction is considerably more than subtle. We can all
agree that U.S. agriculture  needs fundamental structural reform and
that reform should introduce  greater market discipline  in determin-
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concerned  about the  adaptiveness  of these  two  radically  different
types of entrepreneurial  experience-one  of maximizing profitability
(for example, the Massachusetts technological  entrepreneur) or maxi-
mizing output (the farmer).
High Levels  of Technology  Transfer
Once the process of technology-driven  revitalization has started,  it
becomes  strongly  reinforcing.  Successful  high-tech  companies  in
Massachusetts  produced  spin-offs  as  ambitious  employees  and  re-
searchers assumed an entrepreneurial  role and ventured out on their
own. Each  new company, in turn, provided a role model for another.
The magnitude  of this process is truly significant.
Between  1965-75 roughly  one  half of the new  computer  company
products  were the result of direct  technology transfer from previous
employers.  Roberts' analysis here is particularly insightful. He iden-
tified  thirty-nine  new  business  enterprises  started  by  forty-four
former  employees  of  one  large  Boston-based  electronics  company.
Only a short time later, the thirty-two surviving firms had aggregate
sales double that of the "parent company"  from which the entrepre-
neurs had spun  off (Roberts). Thus  one  of the most conspicuous  ad-
vantages of having many small technology-driven  firms has been the
acceleration of other new firms in related technologies.  A small num-
ber of these firms have grown  to become  major  manufacturing  com-
panies, thus contributing significantly  to new job growth.
Further,  Massachusetts  has  also  benefited  from the  tendency  of
some entrepreneurs  to start multiple enterprises-leaving  one estab-
lished successful  venture to found another. Among the better known
examples  are Philippe  Villers  who cofounded  Computervision,  Inc.,
of  Bedford,  founded  Billerica-based  Automatix,  Inc.,  and  recently
started Cognition, Inc., in Billerica; J. William Poduska, a cofounder
of Prime  Computer, Inc.,  of Natick, founder of Apollo Computer, Inc.,
of Chelmsford, who recently launched Stellar Computer, Inc.,  of New-
ton;  and  Henry  E.  Kloss,  who  successively  founded  Acoustic  Re-
search,  KLH,  Advent  and Kloss Video.  This again  underscores  the
self-reinforcing  nature of the technology transfer process.
In addition,  while  this corporate  spin-off process  was an integral
part of the Massachusetts economic revitalization process, academic,
government  and  not-for-profit  research  labs  also  played  a  critical
role.  In one MIT  study, more than 200 new technical  ventures were
founded by ex-employees of MIT labs and academic departments  and
government  labs during the late  1950s to the mid-1960s.  Moreover,
follow-up studies have shown that four out of five of these firms have
survived' (Roberts, p.  252). If documentation from the experiences  of
other  Boston-  Cambridge-based  academic  institutions  were  added,
the full economic  impact could  be  more  accurately  judged,  but the
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significant.
Before turning to the role of aggressive  capital financing, it is im-
portant to note that the process of technology transfer in Massachu-
setts  was  facilitated  by  the  presence  of  a  substantial  regional
manufacturing  and business infrastructure that provided  support to
the area's newly-created technologically-based  industries. Massachu-
setts, especially the greater Boston area, contains a strong technolog-
ical infrastructure or network of support firms in manufacturing and
services  as  well as  a large  pool  of skilled  labor.  Historically,  this
technological base grew out of the late 19th and first half of the 20th
centuries.  As  the  electronics  industry  grew,  this  infrastructure
adjusted and expanded  to meet  new needs. Today, this network  also
includes sophisticated  business  services-accounting,  new  business
development services,  patent protection and complex technical  prod-
uct  licensing  sensitive  to  the  specialized  needs  of  technology
start-ups.
High-Tech  Facility Siting
For quite  some time, I have been especially  interested in the spa-
tial dynamics  of new facility investments.  Contrary to common per-
ception,  high-growth, high-tech firms  have consistently preferred to
site new production facilities in suburban and rural areas, choosing
to quit their city locations as soon as financial dynamics permit. The
point is that these firms, when younger, very much need to be near a
university  or research  lab,  but  as  production becomes  the  central
issue, a suburban or rural area is the preferred  choice. These facility
investments  have  already  had  a significant  impact  on land  use in
Massachusetts  and New  England.
Aggressive  Capital Financing
Quite often,  the financing  needs  of high-tech  companies  are  dis-
cussed in terms of their access to venture capital. Equity, in the form
of venture  capital,  is the  major  source  of financing  for  new  enter-
prises. Venture capital provides the bulk of the early or development
stage funding for high-tech firms. While the role of venture capital is
critical and should not be minimized,  I would like to concentrate  on
how banks, at the proper stage of development,  have  helped put to-
gether the  overall  financing  packages  that  have  allowed  "coming
companies" to become "going and growing"  concerns.
Without  doubt,  the creation  and  growth  of new  high-technology
firms  have  required  new  bank  financing  strategies.  Traditionally,
1The role  of defense spending for long-term  research and development  should  not be  minimized as an  additional
causative factor in technology transfer  from defense  to nondefense products.
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tained level of commercial activity; a history of profitable operations;
an accumulation  of business  assets  such as accounts  receivable,  in-
ventory, plant and equipment;  and a large capitalization in order to
fully support the bank's commitment to lend at the time the commit-
ment is extended to the company.  This financing strategy, while ap-
propriate in many cases, does give rise to the often quoted  customer
complaint  that banks  "are only willing to lend me  money when  I
don't need it."
High-tech financing has required a shift in the timing of these fun-
damentals.  The Bank  of Boston lending experience  in the 1960s and
1970s with these industries  traces  out what  we like  to regard as a
new and innovative banking pattern.
First, target the bank loan commitment to the best entrepreneurial
talent-not necessarily  to the established  company or the developed
product. It is the entrepreneur who drives growth and who will capi-
talize on new product ideas  in the face of difficulties. It is the entre-
preneur  who  has  identified  the  market  opportunity  and  new
technology;  who has attracted a sufficient  level of venture capital to
underwrite the development stage, which may last two to three years
or more; and who has assembled a team  of managers and directors
capable  of developing  and  implementing  the  firm's  business  plan.
These elements are-first and foremost-essential  for any successful
venture.
Second,  as this  development  stage  process  unfolds,  the entrepre-
neur and the venture  capitalists will  look to the banks to make  an
initial commitment to fund the future levels of business activity once
the  firm  becomes  self-sustaining.  Banks  in  New  England  have
learned  to  make  commitments  at  the  earliest  stage  of  business
creation-to complement,  but not compete  with, the role  of the ven-
ture  capitalist's  equity  investment-not  after the  business  has  be-
come established in the market.
Banks in other regions and other countries  will undoubtedly find
that, as in the case of Massachusetts, entrepreneurs  given the proper
flow of venture capital do not need to draw heavily upon these banks'
commitments.  Yet these bank  loan commitments  to high-tech firms
serve  as a signal  of endorsement to investors, thereby enabling the
entrepreneur  to  raise private  capital  on  favorable  terms.  Often,  a
bank's own venture capital arm may invest in the early-stage rounds
of equity financing,  and even a modest level of asset-based financing
for plant and  equipment  is  now  commonplace  during the develop-
ment stage.
Third, just as the venture capital support must be continued, if not
increased, during the high-growth periods of the firm's development,
it is particularly  important that the entrepreneur be able to rely on
the bank's loan commitment at that very time of above-average lever-
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dows of opportunity and, at times, startling growth rates, even in an
environment  of a  national  economic  downturn.  It  is  during  such
times that the confidence  and fortitude of the banker is often put to
the greatest test.
In short, the prerequisites must come full circle;  i.e., the entrepre-
neurial spirit  of a region's manufacturing  base must eventually  ex-
tend  into  what  are  usually  regarded  as  the  most  conservative
business institutions,  mainly banks.
The Massachusetts  Miracle and the Role  of Partnerships
Over the past decade, there has been  much discussion about part-
nerships  as  a  tool to  stimulate  economic  growth.  Partnerships  be-
tween business and government, government and labor or among all
three have  been put  forth as  solutions to the problems  of stagnant
and  declining  economies.  In  the  1980s  partnerships  have  become
panaceas.  I, too, have held that view and,  in 1976, when we founded
the Council  for Economic Action-a Boston-based nonprofit economic
development  organization  that  I chair-we  were  convinced that  by
bringing together disparate groups, by creating unlikely alliances  or
partnerships,  we  could  generate  the  spark that  would  once  again
ignite  the  region's  economy.  Events  and  the  history  we  have just
touched upon would seem  to have borne out this view.  Looking back
and seriously considering these events, we no longer believe that this
vision represents reality.
Consider  with  me  for  a  moment three  major  partnership  models
frequently  cited  by  economic  development  specialists:  commercial
partnerships,  industrial  partnerships  and  job  retention  partner-
ships.2 These models have proved to be somewhat effective in shaping
the location and pace  of existing growth momentum.  However, they
have shown themselves to be most effective in a situation of strongest
growth,  and  even then one  must  recognize  that they operate  effec-
tively  only  when  they lag-that is,  are preceded  by actual  business
investment and growth.  Where partnerships  invariably fail is where
they  attempt  to  be  the  "leading"  force-that  is,  acting  on  the as-
sumption that they can create growth.
The  history  of economic  growth  and  development  shows  clearly
that  we live in a demand-side  world.  The  overwhelming  preponder-
ance  of evidence  suggests  that rearranging supply  factors  will not
create a willingness to invest where it does not otherwise exist. Thus
we do not believe that partnerships  can be successful  in attempting
to initiate growth.
Now let us consider each of these models in greater detail to see if
we can draw some conclusions that will be useful to those interested
21  have omitted housing partnerships  from this list inasmuch as my  central thrust is  economic  regeneration.
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revitalization.
Commercial Partnerships
Commercial  partnerships  are  perhaps  the  most  prevalent.  They
come together to facilitate the development of office, retail and other
commercial  facilities.  In  large cities throughout  the United States,
such as Boston, San Francisco, San Antonio, and in Europe there are
numerous  successful  examples  of  cities  and  developers  working
together-each  giving and gaining for a  common  benefit. In strong
real estate  markets, it has even  become  possible to institute  "link-
age"  programs  in  which  a  developer-in  order  to  obtain  planning
permission  to develop  a prime downtown  site-must  agree to estab-
lish payments  to a fund for low-income housing  or agree  to develop
simultaneously  a less desirable  "neighborhood"  parcel. This has be-
come fairly common in Boston and the ongoing Heritage on the Com-
mon is merely one  example of linkage at work.
The point, however,  is that this partnership  works  only in a situa-
tion in which there is already dynamic growth. The partnerships  are
created in response to a rapid acceleration  of demand caused by tech-
nological  innovation  and/or  growth in population  and income.  It is
the dynamic process  of urban agglomeration  that provides the criti-
cal  impetus.  The partnerships-and  for that matter the  urban  re-
newal  investment project-in themselves  are not the creative  force.
Industrial Partnerships
Industrial partnerships  in which  various groups  within a commu-
nity unite to attract,  finance and provide  a location for manufactur-
ing facilities have a long history.  In the state of Mississippi as early
as 1936, the creation  of the Industrial Revenue  Bond financing pro-
grams  established the pattern  of much that would  follow.  Over the
past five decades, many new and imaginative industrial partnerships
have  followed.  The  highly  successful  Urban  Development  Action
Grant program would have to be considered  as the grandchild of the
original  Mississippi program.
Here again, as in the case  of commercial partnerships, these efforts
succeed when growth is already underway-when,  for example, high-
tech manufacturing has a strong appetite to invest in new equipment
or in new or renovated  facilities to satisfy a strong demand for pro-
duction  or when  new applications  of existing technologies  have al-
ready  stimulated  demand.  Partnerships  formed  in  the  absence  of
growth  have  not  been  successful.  The  experience  of the  Economic
Development  Administration  in constructing  speculative  industrial
parks  in the  1960s  offers  dramatic  evidence  that supply  does  not
create its own demand.  Many  New  England cities have unfilled  in-
dustrial parks that are  left over from  an era when  urban  and city
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investment  equation.  And  when  one  couples  this  with  the  out-
sourcing  of high-tech  production in the Pacific Rim countries,  there
can be  even greater concern  about the longer-term  economic poten-
tial of rural areas in the United States as investment sites.
Job Retention Partnerships
Job  retention  partnerships  have  been  one  of the  ways  in which
older, previously  industrialized cities  have addressed  specialized de-
velopment  problems.  For  example,  the  Boston  Economic  Develop-
ment Industrial  Corporation (EDIC) has been able to maintain blue
collar job opportunities in the City of Boston, specifically  in the ap-
parel  industry.  The partnerships-put  together through  the leader-
ship of Mayor Raymond Flynn and Marily Schwartz-Lloyd,  director of
Boston's EDIC-have been successful in retaining a targeted group of
jobs in the central city.  Again, this took place in what was already a
dynamically  growing  economy  among  established  industries  that
could survive only by utilizing cheap labor in the city through deeply
subsidized production  space. Such partnerships have been successful
in retaining jobs in the central city, but they have not in themselves
created economic growth.
A Few  Caveats
In conclusion, although one will readily acknowledge  that partner-
ships have many advantages and can be effective in building support-
ive community attitudes toward growth, one must be mindful of their
limitations  and not seek to create  for them tasks that are  inappro-
priate to their nature.
In reinforcing  growth,  in expanding  an existing  growth  dynamic,
even  in marginally  shifting the geographical  focus of growth,  part-
nerships are often successful. But when it comes to creating  growth I
am led back  once again  to the economic  fundamentals.  Growth  de-
.rives from technological  innovation and increases in population and
income.  The  economic  revitalization  of  Massachusetts  was  essen-
tially the work  of a wide number  of talented individuals  who,  clus-
tered  around  our  academic  institutions,  developed  entirely  new
technologies  and moved into production to satisfy extraordinary  de-
mand for their products.  In the process they created the wealth and
business  investment  that has  made  Massachusetts  the envy  of the
country.
The central thrust of my line of reasoning is that economic develop-
ment  through  technology  requires  a  new  set  of  fundamentals;
namely,  technical  or  engineering  entrepreneurship,  technology
transfer  and aggressive  capital  financing. Without  question,  these
are factors that are almost solely concentrated  in a few  large urban
areas and cannot be easily replicated  in other urban areas, let alone
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ization  through  technology  has  a  very  limited  applicability  to  the
rest of the country.
It would be wrong to end my remarks on such a negative note. We
must  not  lose  sight  of the  fact that roughly  one-third  of the  U.S.
population chooses to live in small cities and rural areas. Given that
this reality  will most likely  continue  to prevail  for some time, the
challenge  is to find new public policies that address the rural, often
left behind, areas.
I am increasingly  persuaded that the most direct path to achieving
self-sustaining  development  in  small  cities  and  rural  areas  is
through a strategy  based on import-replacement  industries;  that is,
by the creation of new business enterprises in local areas as a substi-
tute  for  goods  and  services  heretofore  imported  from  the  larger,
nearby urban places.  The  broad-based creation  of firms in these in-
dustries  will permit  small cities  and rural  areas to achieve  a  new
level of economic  independence  from surrounding urban areas.
Through the Council for Economic Action mentioned earlier we are
now in the process of beginning to undertake  an import replacement
industry  project  in three  rural areas  in the United  States.  At this
time,  I  know  of  no other  such project  in the  country  and,  as  our
activities  evolve  over the  next  several  years,  I  would welcome  the
opportunity  to discuss our results with your organization.
Thus we  can conclude  that there is a basis for optimism  for rural
areas.  The  economic  future  of these  communities  can be  improved
through a broader understanding of the spatial dynamics of our econ-
omy,  targeting  import replacement  industries  and encouraging  the
creation in rural areas of new firms in these industries.
REFERENCES
Allen, Thomas. Managing  the Flow of Technology. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985.
Everett,  Rogers,  and Floyd  Shoemaker.  Communication of Innovations: A  Cross-Cultural Approach. Glencoe  IL:
Free  Press, 1974.
Lipset,  Seymour. "Values, Education, and Entrepreneurship." Elites in Latin America. S. Lipset and A.  Solari, eds.
pp.  3-59. New  York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Roberts, Edward. "A Basic Study of Innovators:  How  to Keep and Capitalize  on Their  Talents." Research Manage-
ment, no. 4,  1968, pp. 249-66.
25RURAL REVITALIZATION:
OPPORTUNITIES, POLICY
ISSUES AND
DIVERSIFICATION
OPTIONS